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0. Introduction 
 
“Religion” and “revelation” are terms thoroughly intertwined in their historical 
development. In the proper, i.e. historically established sense of these words, we cannot speak 
of religion without revelation or revelation without religion. One could certainly add the 
qualification: without revelation in some sense, or without religion in some other sense. Still, 
in their histories as well as in their present states, religion and revelation, in some sense or 
other, are complementary phenomena (cf. Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, V, D). 
Today both notions are used in a variety of senses, such that their meaning tends to 
obscure the origins and historical evolution of the terms themselves. Nevertheless, without the 
proper clarification of the epistemic framework of historical origins we are in a situation 
similar to what A. MacIntyre describes at the beginning of After Virtue (Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
We find ourselves among fragments of meaning, which cannot be properly put together 
without the knowledge of the whole where these fragments originally belong into: in our case, 
the historically evolving meaning of religion and revelation. 
The importance of the history of philosophy, as MacIntyre argued, can be determined 
with respect to the content certain meanings play in our understanding. Looking into the 
historical development we can overcome the initial naiveté characteristic of our prima facie 
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approach to central notions of our heritage. More specifically, the knowledge of historical 
processes helps us to see the structure and content of certain notions such that we can 
understand better their past, present, and possible future. In what follows, I attempt to explain 
briefly the importance of some developments in the meaning of religion and revelation with 
special respect to 19th century German philosophy. (René Latourelle, Theology of Revelation, 
Staten Island, N.Y., Alba House, 1967; Wilhelm Weischedel,  Der Gott der Philosophen. 
Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983; Miklos Vetö, De Kant à Schelling: les deux voies 
de l'idéalisme allemand, Grenoble: Million, 1998-2000). 
 
 
1. The Crisis of Religion 
 
When I use the expression “the crisis of religion”, I do not simply refer to the “religious 
crisis” as often formulated today with respect to the developments of modernity and 
secularization. (Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 2007) What I 
more importantly mean is the crisis of the meaning of the term religio. As has been remarked 
many times by important experts, religio is a unique development of Western and Western-
related languages. (Kerber, Walter, Der Begriff der Religion, München: Kindt, 1994; Mezei 
Balázs, Vallásbölcselet, Gödöllő: Attraktor, 2005, I, 2. §) Languages unrelated, either 
linguistically, historically, or semantically to Classical and Middle Age Latin do not possess a 
term of an equivalent meaning (Max Müller, Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of 
Thought, London: Longmans Green, 1888). Not even Classical Greek had an exact expression 
of what pre-Roman Latin language users meant by religio.1 
                                                 
1
 The Greek threskeia means piety. Some other Greek expressions of the Classical age, such nomos, sebeia, or 
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Traditional and speculative etymologies of the word religio—as for instance by Cicero, 
Lactantius, St. Augustine or St. Thomas—offer interpretations which presuppose a 
historically later meaning of the word.2 The original meaning, however, was close to what we 
call “taboo” today. The prefix “re” in re-ligio does not refer to the meaning “back” or “again” 
in this case, but rather to the emphatic confirmation of ligo, “to bind.”3 Thus religio was in 
                                                                                                                                                        
hodos describe aspects of what the Latin religio came to express. It is interesting to note here that there are 
languages of European origin in which a term other than a version of the Latin religio is used to denote the 
content of religion. In some Slavic languages, the term expressing a God-relationship is used (Slovakian 
náboženstvo, Czech náboženství). In Slovenian, religion is vere, which is related to the verb believe. In 
Afrikaans, religion is godsdiens, (cf. German Gottesdienst, service of God). In Finnish, the word uskonto comes 
from the word faith (usko). In Hungarian, the meaning of religion is expressed by the word vallás, which 
originates in the verb vallani, to confess. Here vallás actually means confessing “reality as it is”, in accordance 
with the best knowledge of the agent.  
2
 According to Cicero, religio comes from relegere, to read again (Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Nature of the 
Gods, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, II, xxviii). For Lactantius, religio is derived from religati (Lactantius, 
Divinae institutiones, Paris : Cerf, 1971, IV, 28, 2). Augustine offers more than one etymology, the most famous 
is re-legere (Augustinus, De civitate dei, Stutgardiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1981, X, 3). St. Thomas’ most 
interesting and somewhat playful etymology binds the word religo to se ligo, to bind itself [to God] (Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, Parisiorum: Lethielleux, 1967, III, 119). These etymologies were not meant by 
their authors as genuine explorations of grammatical origin. Rather, these authors wished to suggest a hidden 
meaning of the word, thereby throwing light on the important core meaning of the word itself.  
3
 „Concerning the etymology of this word [religio], various opinions were prevalent among the ancients. Cicero 
derives it from relegere, an etymology favoured by the verse cited ap. Aulus Gellius 4, 9, 1, religentem esse 
oportet, religiosum nefas; whereas Servius (as Vergilius, Aeneis, 8, 349), Lactantius (4, 28), Augustine 
(Retractationes 1, 13) al., assumes religare as the primitive, and for this derivation Lactantius cites the 
expression of Lucretius (1, 931; 4, 7); religionum nodis animos exsolvere. Modern etymologists mostly agree 
with this later view, assuming as root lig, to bind, whence also lic-tor, lex, and ligare; hence, religio sometimes 
means the same as obligatio.”… „Religio as reverence for God (the gods), the fear of God, connected with a 
careful pondering of divine things; piety, religion, both pure inward piety and that which is manifested in 
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pre-Roman Latin language something strictly bound by a higher power. More important than 
its original meaning is the spectacular development, the historical evolution of the meaning of 
religio—from its totemistic origins to the description of a unique yet universal phenomenon 
of religion as we understand the word today. 
This historical development of the meaning of religio is both synthetic and dynamic. 
The meaning of the word is synthetic as it connects not only various meanings related to 
religio—such as subjective and objective components—but it integrates almost seamlessly 
separate historical developments into a unified meaning, the meaning of religion. Today one 
could use the brief formula that 
Religion is the integrated system of subjective objectivity and objective subjectivity 
in a historical perspective.4 
 
On the other hand, the meaning of religio is dynamic as it develops directly from its 
archaic origins, through Hellenistic political meanings, into the modern and contemporary 
universal sense of the word. Moreover, even today religion is an open term—open to its 
further developments and various applications.5 This fact explains its widespread use today 
for as different phenomena as the positive religions, such as the monotheistic religions on the 
one hand, and on the other hand to phenomena related to the religion mentioned e. g. in a song 
                                                                                                                                                        
religious rites and ceremonies; hence the rites and ceremonies, as well as the entire system of religion and 
worship, the res divinae or sacrae, were frequently called religio or religiones.” (Lewis and Short, A Latin 
Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon 2002 (1879), 1556) 
4
 I use this formula in my Hungarian language Philosophy of Religion (Mezei, Vallásbölcselet, vol. II. p. 542). 
5
 Cf. the notion of „open religion” in Balázs Mezei, “Religion after Auschwitz: Jonas, Metz and the Place of 
Religion in our World Today”, A. Singh—P. Losonczi (eds), From Political Theory to Political Theology, 
London—New York: Continuum, 2009, 111-122. 
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by R. E. M.6 In the song “Losing my religion”, as is presented in the exceptionally 
imaginative video-clip, “religion” appears as the general label of customs, morals, beliefs 
traditionally accepted in a given circle of society for a given period of time yet losing sense 
today. “Losing one’s religion” refers to radical changes with respect to the meaning of 
religion. Instead of the disintegrating parts of traditional systems, the focus today is on the 
isolated individual seeking his and her place in the place left empty by the disintegration of 
earlier religious forms.7  
The crisis of religion—the crisis of the meaning of religio—appears as a historical 
occurrence already present in many developments of the term. One important development 
was the time around the beginning of our era when religio absorbed the meaning of related 
Greek terms, such as nomos (law), sebeia (piety), threskeia (religiousness), or homologia 
(confession of truth/reality). Another important change occurred with the revival of Western 
Christianity in the 9th century, when religio assumed a strongly political meaning in 
accordance with the re-establishing of the idea of the Western Roman Empire. A most 
significant development came with the Muslim occupation Constantinople in 1453: As is 
reflected in the writings of Nicolaus of Cusa (especially Nicolaus Cusanus, De pace fidei, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 2002), the application of religio to a non-Christian 
formation, traditionally denoted merely as a secta (school), opened a new horizon in the 
development of the universal meaning of the term. (cf. Gergely Bakos, On Faith, Rationality, 
and the Other in the Late Middle Ages, Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick 2010) 
In the 16th century, it seemed for some decades that a new term could supplant old 
religio. When various branches of the Protestant Reformation denoted themselves as 
                                                 
6
 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwUZVkKfE70 
7
 For a thoroughgoing elaboration of the modern and contemporary use of the word, see Taylor, A Secular Age, 
Part IV.  
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confessiones, for a time confessio became widely used instead of religio both in Catholic 
(confessiones in a pejorative sense) and Protestant (confessio in a positive sense) sources. The 
use of confessio signaled a new meaning emerging out of the meaning of religio: the meaning 
emphasizing the role of the free human subject, almost a “person” in our sense today, in the 
restructuring of traditional religion, in his or her acts with respect to God, Church, doctrines, 
and tradition. Religio thus became “confessional”, something originating not in the cosmos or 
a meta-cosmic God, but instead in the free human subject, in the subjectivity of the faithful 
person trusting her life to Christ. However, with the institutional consolidation of Protestant 
movements, the use of confessio replaced again religio—even if in a slightly changed 
meaning of the latter word, a meaning already containing as its center the notion of the 
individual-personal act of faith.8 
The crisis of religion in the 19th century can be analyzed as a certain crisis of the 
meaning of the term. By the 19th century, Protestant confessiones had become well-
established religiones in many European countries with robust political, social and economic 
structures. Rationalism and naturalism had introduced a naturalistic meaning into religion, a 
meaning expressed in the compound “natural religion” or, just to mention one example, The 
Natural History of Religion by David Hume. The French Enlightenment, nevertheless, strived 
to delete not only certain features from the meaning of religion, such as the traditional-
transcendent or the subjective-immanent, but religion itself in its core meaning. Religion as a 
mere cult for the masses—this is what retained some sort of meaning for the French 
revolutionaries who attempted to destroy all kinds of traditional religion and introduced, 
instead, the “cult of reason”—without religion in the traditional sense. (cf. Thomas Molnar, 
The Decline of the Intellectual, Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994)  
                                                 
8
 Some trends in Catholic counter-reformation, such as Jesuitism, were at least as individualistic and person-
oriented than Protestant, especially Puritanistic movements.  
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The Aufklärung or German Enlightenment, nevertheless, did not share many aspects of 
the period of Les lumiéres in France.9 Among the most influential representatives of the 
Aufklärung hardly anyone was a confessed atheist or a materialist (in the coming generations, 
the materialism of a Feuerbach was again of a very peculiar, I would say mystical kind). 
Rather, German Aufklärung was in many ways religious, thus preparing the way for German 
Romanticism. That was possible because religiosity, in the Protestant territories of the 
German Empire, was not strictly bound to traditional liturgical and hierarchic forms. Pietism 
as a widespread and free-spirited movement offered a religion close to subjective spirituality 
and definitely distanced itself from established cultic forms. Goethe appears to have been 
fairly open to non-Christian forms (and in freemasonry that was a perfectly viable option), but 
he refused superficial atheism. Not only was he deeply mystical, but a certain piety imbues his 
works, as mirrored for instance in the famous end piece of the 2nd part of the Faust (“Woman 
eternal draws us on high.”) Schiller, the first in the line of the great German idealist 
philosophers (Rüdiger Safranski, Schiller als Philosoph, Beril: Siedler, 2005), breathes the air 
of a deeply religious spirituality, such as in his famous The Walk. (Spaziergang, c. f. 
Safranski, Schiller oder die Erfindung des deutschen Idealismus. München: Hanser, 2004) 
The style of 19th century German philosophy remains similarly mystical, sometimes 
paradoxical, even though well defined and apparently important elements of religiosity may 
be missing in the work of influential figures, such as Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, M. Stirner, or 
F. Nietzsche.10 
In a pregnant sense we can say that what occurred in German philosophy between, and 
                                                 
9
 This can be see for instance in the correspondence between Goethe and Schiller, cf. Liselotte Dieckmann, 
Correspondence between Goethe and Schiller 1794-1805. New York: P. Lang, 1994.  
10
 To speak of Nietzsche’s religiousness may appear contrary to Nietzsche’s sometimes strong empiricism. 
However, just the figure of Zarathustra shows the fact how deeply Nietzsche was aware of the significance of a 
kind of religiousness, a new kind indeed yet still a phenomenon related to the tradition of religio.  
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including, Kant and Nietzsche was in many ways a reaction to the crisis of religion as 
developed out of the Protestant Reformation. German philosophy in this period may be rightly 
called, with an expression of J. N. Findlay, “German Theology.” (J. N. Findlay, The 
Discipline of the Cave, London: Allen & Unwin, 1966) As Nietzsche famously remarked, 
“The Protestant pastor is the grandfather of German philosophy.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Antichrist, London: Solar Books, 2007, ch. 10). This remark is so much true that we can add: 
Nietzsche himself came from an old family of Protestant pastors. German culture was 
theologically inclined and resulted in surprisingly new theological and religious proposals 
even in the arts, as shown for instance by Richard Wagner’s metaphysically audacious works, 
such as the Parsifal.11  
Whatever is the future of the term of religio, we can clearly see its historical dynamism. 
It can be see too that the contemporary, widespread and many-sided use of the term, while 
gradually leaving behind its historical origins, opens new possibilities in its semantic 
development. These possibilities point beyond the historical scope of religio and open 
fundamentally new vistas in our cultural history.  
  
2. Religion and Revelation 
 
The notion of divine revelation has been central to the concept of religion as construed 
on Christian principles. However central the notion was in the theological sense, yet the first 
tractate concentrating specifically on the notion of revelation did not appear before the 18th 
century. As R. Latourelle suitably points out, the theological doctrine of revelation was 
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 In the original libretto of the Parsifal, the final lines read: “Miracle of supreme salvation! Our Redeemer 
redeemed!” Here we find Wagner’s stage description: “A beam of light: the Grail glows at its brightest. From the 
dome a white dove descends and hovers over Parsifal’s head.—Kundry slowly sinks lifeless to the ground in 
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eclipsed during the first millennium by the debates and clarifications of other doctrines, such 
as those of Christology and Ecclesiology. In the First Scholasticism, most importantly in the 
works of Thomas Aquinas, we find many passages on the notion of revelation—even thought, 
for St. Thomas, the basic meaning of revelatio is prophetic inspiration (Latourelle, Theology 
of Revelation, 170). In the general sense it can be said that our contemporary idea of 
revelation, as e. g. John Baillie pointed out, had only a fragmentary presence in the 
theological literature before the 18th century. (John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent 
Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) 
The most important reason for this situation was the unchallenged validity of a world-
view in which a certain notion of divine revelation appeared self-evident. The very possibility 
of the existence of some higher power, gods or a god, was taken for granted, and the suitable 
communication of such beings was naturally considered as given in so many forms: in 
dreams, visions, hallucinations, in the sound of tree-leaves or in the flight of birds, or again in 
the authority of old, mystery-laden writings. That is to say, some natural notion of revelation, 
the communication of higher powers to human beings, was so deeply wired into the 
consciousness of pre-modern humanity, that a thorough-going elaboration of this piece of 
natural knowledge must have seemed superfluous. Almost all the central pieces of Classical 
literature, from Greek poetry through the Septuagint to Christian theology, presupposed this 
understanding of the universe where “revelation” in a fundamental sense was not only 
possible but, in some sense, generally actual. The question was not the possibility of 
revelation; it was rather the concrete form one could accept as genuine, that is to say coming 
not from lower deities of “demons” but from the head of the spiritual world, God.  
The explanation of the natural meaning of revelation is to be sought in what I call the 
cosmo-theological understanding of reality. According to the cosmo-theological view, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
front of Parsifal, her eyes uplifted to him…” Cf. http://www.rwagner.net/e-frame.html 
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universe is a plenum—a place where there is no vacuum. The importance of the doctrine of 
plenum (Aristotelis Physica, Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1966, IV, 8) however, 
was not merely in its physical significance. The underlying idea is that the universe is a living 
being (zoon), which is composed not only of physical elements, but also of ether, that is to say 
something god-like or spiritual. Such a universe is full of spiritual beings (“demons”, later 
angels and related kinds). These beings uphold a continuous communication among 
themselves and human beings.  In this universe of ongoing communication, higher beings 
know more than lower beings and are thus in a position of instructing the latter. 
Communication, in this hierarchical sense, is a continuous instruction, the final destination of 
which is the human world. A cosmos of revelation, it realized a complicated structure of 
instructions, teachings. Our ancestors lived indeed in a universe of paidea, in a pedagogical 
cosmos. Cosmo-theology expresses the idea that human beings find themselves in such a 
spiritual universe where they belong to a hierarchical strictly defined position. The visible 
universe, especially the planets, the stars and the constellations are the expression of the 
spiritual hierarchy. Human beings are part of this living whole where revelation—the 
communication of higher beings to lower ones—is the basic form of communication.12 
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 My expression cosmo-theology originates in the term „cosmo-theism” coined by H. von Glasenapp (Helmuth 
von Glasenapp, Die fünf grossen Religionen, Düsseldorf: E. Diederich, 1951) and further analysed by J. 
Assmann (Jan Assmann, Monotheismus und Kosmotheismus: Ägyptische Formen eines "Denkens des Einen" 
und ihre europäische Rezeptionsgeschichte, Heidelberg: Winter, 1993). According to cosmo-theology, the basic 
structures of reality become accessible especially in the phenomena of the sky (sun, moon, planets, stars, 
constellations etc.), that is in their movements and relationships. The comso-theological pattern determines 
theistic and monotheistic schemes of earlier and later religious forms, such as that of Christianity, and thus 
imbues human consciousness in a fashion that remains effective in various ways even in the age of science. The 
contemporary human impetus to know ever more of the starry sky (distant clouds, exoplanets etc.) originates, 
historically as well as mimetically (R. Dawkins), in the ancient human desire to dialogize with the stars or gods 
and become similar to (Plato) or even unified with (Aristotle) these heavenly entities. 
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Based on the cosmo-theological construction of reality, the writings of the Old and the 
New Testament offered formulas—those of God’s locutions to humans—which made the 
impression of unchallengeable self-evidence on the then contemporary readers. The 
widespread use of extra-canonical writings in and around the first Christian communities 
showed the influence of the genre of gala, a Hebrew term which was translated into Greek as 
apocalupsis. The content of a gala was prophetic communication of God to an elected one 
with the task of transmitting the message to others, existing at the threshold of the annihilation 
of the world. Such a gala we find already in the Old Testament, in the visions of Ezekiel or 
Daniel, and most importantly in the New Testament, in John’s Revelations. The Latin 
revelatio was a simple translation of apocalupsis, with the basic meaning “removing of 
cover.” 
Every word of the Gospels in the New Testament strictly presupposes first the schema 
of gala, second the cosmo-theological construction of the universe, the pedagogical cosmos. 
Jesus appears as the embodiment of God’s communication, as His Word; Jesus’ deeds, words, 
even his life and death were seen as a gala par excellence. Just as the sun, the moon, the 
planets and the stars reveal their genuine nature by moving through the sky and associating 
themselves with various heavenly entities, so too the Jesus of the Gospels move around in a 
geographical area—in an age when geography always had a stellar equivalent—and becomes 
associated with various figures. Jesus reveals his genuine nature to these actors and groups of 
actors between the starting point of birth (signified by conspicuous heavenly occurrences, 
such as the Star of Bethlehem) and the end point of death (signaled again by exceptional 
meteorological events, such a full eclipse of the sun). Jesus’ death nevertheless points to his 
rise again after three and half days, that is after the period during which the moon, seen 
geocentrically, remains invisible. (For more detail see Arthur Drews, Der Sternhimmel in der 
Dichtung und Religion der alten Völker und des Christentums, Jena: Diederichs, 1924) 
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A different aspect of apocalupsis was its mysterious character. This character may have 
been originated in Hellenistic mystery cults of Egyptian, Greek, and Asian origins. (R. 
Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen nach ihrer Grundgedanken und 
Wirkungen, Leipzig-Berlin: Teubner, 1927; László Kákosy, Fény és káosz: A kopt gnósztikus 
kódexek, Budapest: Gondolat, 1984) The point in a mystery cult was, precisely, that it wasn’t 
public; it offered experiences and teachings retained for the few elects who were prohibited to 
speak of these mysteries on the burden of death.13 Still, a metaphorical description of the 
mysteries was allowed, and this feature lent the literary form of apocalupsis an 
overemphasized role of metaphors and analogies—as we can see not only in John’s 
Relevations but also in the parables of Christ, which were explained exclusively to the elect 
ones as “secrets” (τὰ μυστήρια, enigmata) hidden from the masses (cf. Matthew 13:11).14 
Accordingly, the central form of divine revelation in Hellenistic religions, as well as in 
the New Testament, was divine locution to the elect in a mysterious and pedagogical form. 
For Irenaeus, revelation is knowledge in accordance with the apostolic tradition. For Clement 
of Alexandria, revelation is God’s inner voice in the soul. Origen writes of God’s living and 
self-revealing word. Although for St. Augustine, revelatio is no central expression, he knows 
of God’s speaking, even in audible voice, to a human individual. For St. Bonaventure, God’s 
revelation is his unification with the soul. For Thomas Aquinas, as mentioned, revelation can 
be supernatural knowledge, but centrally it is prophetic revelation, revelatio prophetica. (For 
more detail see Latourelle, ibid.) 
The rapid development of mathematics and engineering during the 14-16th centuries 
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 See for instance the introduction of Claudianus to De raptu Proserpinae: Claudianus, Works, London: W. 
Heinemann, 1922. 
14
 “He answered and said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of 
heaven, but to them it is not given.” 
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gradually directed the attention of scholars form the supernatural sources of revelation to 
eternal verities accessible for the unassisted human mind. The discovery of new continents, 
peoples, cultures, and religions raised the question concerning the relationship between 
natural and supernaturally revealed knowledge. St. Thomas expressly said that certain pieces 
of knowledge, such as moral imperatives, may be reached by our natural faculty, yet they are 
revealed in the Bible so that we can learn them more easily. (Latourelle, ibid, 153 sq.) David 
Hume was not the first thinker to ask whether we need any sort of revelation inaccessible for 
the natural mind. For, as he argues, the contents of revelation cannot contradict human reason; 
the occurrence of supernatural revelation as a miracle is less than probable. (David Hume, A 
Dissertation on the Passions: The Natural History of Religion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2007) Hume could refer to the standpoint of John Locke, for whom supernatural revelation as 
illumination cannot contradict reason without risking the danger of enthusiasm—a frightening 
danger for a genuine Englishman of the 17-18th centuries (John Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, Glasgow: Urie (s. a.), On Enthusiasm 4). Revelation in the old sense 
appeared to be in a crisis in that age; for if it contradicted natural reason it was seen 
dangerous; if it did not contradict natural reason, it appeared superfluous. 
The crisis of religion in the 19th century was at the same time the deep crisis of 
revelation; since however the Church, with its stable and complicated structure of institutions, 
was not directly involved in then contemporary scientific and philosophical debates, the 
growing implausibility of the notion of revelation did not immediately affect its central 
doctrines. Leading theologians, such as Melchior Cano or Francesco Suarez discussed in 
sophisticated tractates the problem of revelation (Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis, Graz: 
Styria, 1994; for Suarez cf. Latourelle ibid, 189 n. 13). They and other authors too contributed 
to the emergence of the fundamental theological tractatus entitled de revelation. Their central 
point was deeply cosmo-theological as revelation was for them the collection of propositions, 
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even sentences in the strict sense. Beyond the sometimes ambiguous writings of mystical 
thinkers, who did not play an important role in official theology, there was no theoretical 
attempt to challenge the propositional understanding of revelation. It was first in Classical 
German Philosophy when a number of authors emerged, who were at the same time 
accomplished theologians and philosophers yet, in their own ways, mystical minds too. (cf. 
Balázs Mezei, “Two Models of Revelation: Propositional vs. Radical” European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, 2009, 1, 99-121) 
 
3. Some Words on Kant’s Influence 
 
Kant’s importance in the development of modern theology and philosophy is immense; 
this is valid for his role in the development of revelation too. The Kantian critique of 
philosophical theology in the Critique of Pure Reason (Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure 
Reason, Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952, B 6111/A583 sq.) is far from being of 
merely logical importance. Rather what he deeply—but from the logical point of view 
dubiously—criticized was an overall understanding of the notion of God as an unjustified 
prolongation of everyday objective experience. The Kantian criticism of the predicate of 
being, as something we cannot freely attribute to the mere notion of God, is rooted in the 
underlying criticism of the kind of being traditional theology credited to God. Indeed, it was 
the nature of being of God, which Kant so sharply criticized; and the Kantian moral argument 
offered, at the same time, a different kind of being as compatible with God, that is to say 
being as a moral postulate. Being as a moral postulate—in contradistinction to narrow 
interpretations—opens up a more central notion of being, in which human freedom and moral 
fulfillment are necessarily synthesized.   
In a different sense, Kant’s critique was based on a re-evaluation of human 
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experience—even though bound to some narrowly understood operative terms, such as the 
definition of experience purely as sense-experience. The re-evaluation of human experience 
started with the exploration of the a priori realm of knowledge and culminated in the moral 
experience of God as necessarily presupposed or postulated. Being is far from being reducible 
to the being of naïve objective experience. Rather, being has a higher or central realm, which 
embraces free human activity. Thus, divine being cannot be analyzed in terms of the being of 
objective experience. Such a being, however, belongs to the necessary and a priori realm of 
experience. Yet this a priori realm does not exist in the real sense as its function is to make 
possible experience. Genuine being is moral being; if God has some genuine being, it must be 
of the moral kind. God is thus morally postulated by free human action; it is moral experience 
that is constitutive of the kind of being we rightly attribute to God. (Weischedel, Der Gott der 
Philosophen, 191 sq.) 
It is emblematic that Kant compared his idea of philosophy to the discovery of the 
heliocentric view of the universe by Copernicus. For indeed the Kantian critique attempted to 
surpass the scope of the entire tradition of thinking in terms of the visible universe 
geocentrically conceived—the long tradition of cosmo-theology. This thinking did not only 
influence “science” in the older sense, but determined philosophy and theology too; thus it is 
legitimate to use the term cosmo-theology for the description of pre-Kantian philosophical 
and theological thinking. At the same time, some central tenets of cosmo-theological thinking 
do not necessarily collapse if the tradition is unmasked. For many aspects of cosmo-theology, 
for instance the very notion of reality as manipulable, are rooted in the tradition of cosmo-
theology and remain decisive even after the Kantian criticism, for instance in the 
contemporary notion of the natural sciences.15  
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 Heidegger’s criticism of technology expresses a similar notion. “Philosophy” reached its end inasmuch as it 
has been dissolved in the specific sciences. Yet modern science in general and technology in particular remained 
 16 
By seriously damaging the soundness and logical structure of the traditional proofs for 
the existence of God, Kant prepared the soil for a new understanding of divine 
communication; thus a new understanding of revelation too. In Kant’s work God as a 
necessary idea of the mind reintroduced an epistemic immediacy, as opposed to the mediate 
character of the traditional proofs of God, the ontological proof included, between the human 
mind and notion of God.16 This immediacy overwrote the traditional theology of distance, 
which was construed cosmo-theologically, i.e. on the grounds of a geometrically and 
geocentrically measurable physical distance. On the other hand, God as a morally 
unavoidable, necessary postulate of moral consciousness or practical reason defined a new 
understanding of God’s existence, not in the cosmo-theological terms of empirical existence, 
but in terms of moral postulation (Voraussetzung) which placed God immediately into the 
heart of moral action. The most direct form of this step in Kant was his formulation of the 
categorical imperative as the factual motor of human morality. For a postulate of moral action 
denotes not only a logical necessity; it is rather of genuine ontological importance, a condition 
of human existence.  
The Kantian understanding of God contributed to the historic change in the notion of 
God, traditionally conceived as a form of natural perfection, to the notion of God permeating 
concrete human existence in its core. Kant thus conceives moral reality and the existence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
under the spell of a notion of being, which was derived from Greek ousia. Ousia, however, is just an aspect in 
genuine being, Sein, which is consistently misinterpreted if viewed in the perspective of ousia. Cf. The Question 
concerning Technology, in Martin Heidegger, The Basic Writings. Ed. by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: 
Harper, 1993.  
16
 The ontological proof for the existence of God is based on the recognition of divine presence in the human 
mind. Yet this presence is construed as expressing something fundamentally different from the mind, “that than 
which a greater cannot be thought” or, for Descartes, the notion of infinity. In both cases, as in further versions 
of the ontological argument, epistemic immediacy is eclipsed by infinite distance.  
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God as complementary terms; God, in this sense, loses his objective-natural distance from a 
human person and assumes a structural and dynamic immediacy in human “existence” (which 
already Fichte termed Dasein). On the basis on this immediacy are we able to understand 
Kant’s almost prophetic utterance in the Religion within the limits of reason alone. God’s 
future intervention into history is foretold on the basis of reason in the Kantian sense 
(Vernunft); that is to say, according to the Kantian argument, a certain kind of revelation, 
consonant with Kantian reason, is to be conceived in philosophical terms. (Immanuel Kant, 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, New York: Harper, 1960, part III) 
For Kant, revelation (Offenbarung) is fundamentally historical; it is historical in the 
sense that history is bound to the empirical and the empirical is opposed to the spirit of 
reason. Thus, revelation stands beyond, or before, reason yet it requires reason for initial 
plausibility. The religion of reason or Vernunftsreligion of the future is to be based on God’s 
new kind of revelation reasonable and supernatural at the same time; historical yet perennial, 
and intellectual yet ethical-practical. Still, even for Kant, the highest form of revelation is 
non-empirical but intuitive: it is given in the form of illumination.  
The basis for the transition to that new order of affairs must lie in the principle 
that the pure religion of reason (reine Vernunftsreligion) is a continually occurring 
divine (though not empirical) revelation for all human beings. (Kant, Religion 
within the Limits of Reason Alone, III, VII)  
 
From what I summarized above it is evident that Kant didn’t want to dispose of the 
notion of divine revelation. What he proposes is in fact a revolutionary change in the meaning 
of the notion, yet a change not fully disconnected from earlier features of the notion. Kant’s 
use of the term “history” received a thoroughgoing criticism among others in the works of 
Schelling and Hegel; and revelation as a fact is understood in an unambiguous way by Fichte. 
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Still, without Kant’s seminal influence the notion of revelation as history and fact could not 
develop into its post-Kantian philosophical and theological forms, such as the historical 
understanding of revelation by W. Pannenberg. (Wolfhart Pannenberg, Revelation as History. 
London: Sheed and Ward, 1979) 
 
4. Schelling and the new reality of revelation 
 
Instead of describing the notions of revelation as conceived by Fichte and Hegel, let me 
choose another perspective: that of the nature of revelation. It was the effects of the Second 
Scholasticism, and especially of F. Suarez, that divine revelation was seen emphatically, 
almost exclusively, as strictly embodied in divine statements or propositions. What we call the 
propositional understanding of revelation originates in Scholastic thinking and became 
articulate in the theological literature of the 18th century. The notion of the propositional 
understanding of revelation presupposes a realist notion of God as an extra-terrestrial being 
governing the sun, the stars, and the earth—the cosmo-theological scheme. One of the most 
important effects of the Kantian criticism of the traditional notion of God was the challenge it 
posed for the purely propositional understanding of revelation. For if God is not a natural 
perfection, along the lines of an Aristotelian biologism, then his revelation cannot be 
conceived of as an external locution, in the form of well-defined propositions that are to be 
believed by the faithful on the authority of the Church. While Kant opened the way to a new 
understanding of revelation, his basic understanding did not fundamentally differ from the 
earlier, propositional view. Schleiermacher’s passionate reaction to Kant’s philosophical 
theology was a clear statement of the implausibility of propositional revelation. 
Schleiermacher in fact introduced the universal notion of divine-human encounter based and 
the religious experience of human beings, their feeling. (Friedrich Schleiermacher, On 
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religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1994)17 
However, the most important reinterpretation of the traditional notion of revelation, 
shortly after the Kantian turn, was offered by Schelling. Already Origen uses an expression, 
which may be seen as a forerunner of the later notion of self-revelation. (Origen, Quae extant, 
New York: Paulist, 1979, ch. II)18 And one of the tacit presuppositions of Patristic 
Christology was again the recognition that God the Father reveals or expresses himself in the 
person of Christ—even though all the central expressions involved here (revealing, 
expressing-himself, person) had a significantly different meaning in Greek, Platonizing 
Christianity. Yet divine self-revelation attained a genuinely central role only in the work of 
authors, who changed the traditional notion of God as a natural perfection (the cosmo-
theological view) for a dynamic and monopersonal understanding where the meaning of 
“self” gained a new significance.19 As soon as the “self”, that is core reality, is conceived as a 
historically and morally constituted, dynamic and genuinely personal identity, the meaning of 
                                                 
17
 See the paper by Balázs Mezei, „Two Models of Revelation: Propositional vs. Radical”. 
18
 “Our Saviour, therefore, is the image of the invisible God, inasmuch as compared with the Father Himself He 
is the truth: and as compared with us, to whom He reveals the Father, He is the image by which we come to the 
knowledge of the Father, whom no one knows save the Son, and he to whom the Son is pleased to reveal Him. 
And the method of revealing Him is through the understanding.” (Origen, De principiis, Quae extant, Ch. II) 
19
 The notion of a monopersonal God does not exclude the traditional notion of God’s Trinity, according to 
which God is one essence in three persons. The monopersonal notion of God emphasizes that God Himself is a 
person in a central and important sense: not a fourth person beyond the three persons of the Trinity, but the 
common personal core of the three persons. For the proper understanding of a monopersonalistic view of God, 
we need to see clearly that the traditional notion of God’s persons (hupostaseis, personae) did not express 
accurately the personhood modern age has realized as something central to an individual. The traditional notion 
of personae is closer to the meaning of outlook, appearance, or mask, than to the modern notion of personal 
identity. With the emergence of the latter, a new understanding of God’s personhood is to be developed.  
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“self-revelation” changes too. This change was completed by Schelling. 
In Schelling’s understanding, divine revelation is the meta-historical process of God’s 
self-constitution, his genuine “actus.” God’s original reality is disclosed into its negation by 
the principle of denial, evil, or femininity. Through this denial does it become possible that 
God realizes his full identity and completes the process of universal disclosure or self-
revelation. This meta-historical, yet truly historical process is represented in the development 
of mythological forms, religious formations, where Christianity embodies the transition into 
the fullness of divine self-constitution. (F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 
1841/42, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977) 
The difference between Hegel’s universal history of Spirit and Schelling’s 
Offenbarungsphilosophie (philosophy of revelation) can be found, in my view, in the latter’s 
stronger emphasis on a historical process not strictly identical with chronological history but 
representing a deeper, genuine layer of historicity. (Peter Koslowski, Philosophien der 
Offenbarungen, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001) In Schelling’s thought, the notion of revelation, 
emerging from its modest sources of history, reaches an unparalleled height in the age of 
Christianity, especially in modern Christianity. Revelation becomes the universal 
manifestation of God’s genuine self, a never-ending yet complete self-disclosure, beginning in 
the archaic forms of mythology and leading, through the phases of Christian realization, to the 
ultimate age of positive philosophy. The content of God’s self-revelation is a renovation of 
the being of God by the cooperation of the human spirit. Human beings have as their core task 
to participate in God’s self-fulfillment, in the process of revelation.  
The German word for revelation is Offenbarung (“laying bare”, “disclosure”). If an 
unknown medieval author had not invented this German word as the translation of the Latin 
revelation, later generations of German thinkers may have not found the way to the notion of 
a universal Selbstoffenbarung Gottes, God’s self-disclosure. Indeed, what we find in modern 
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German philosophy—in Nietzsche as well as in M. Scheler and M. Heidegger—can be seen 
as variations and further developments of Schelling’s ingenious thesis about the process of 
divine self-revelation. Given the Catholic Church’s adamant insistence on the propositional 
model of revelation, it is an irony of history that the notion of self-revelation found its way 
into the document Dei Filius of the 1st Vatican Council at the end of the 19th century. The text 
speaks emphatically of God’s “revealing himself”, revelare seipsum. And while the origin of 
this expression goes back to the Letter to the Ephesians (1:9), yet it gains a new meaning in 
the context of 19th century philosophy.20 
 
5. Kierkegaard’s Decisive Turn 
 
Although Kierkegaard main target in his writings is Hegel, his thoughts in matters of 
religion and revelation are in many ways close to those of Schelling. We cannot speak of a 
direct influence, although here and there one can surmise the reflections of Schelling’s 
thought. It was especially the later Schelling, whose famous Berlin lectures Kierkegaard 
attended, whose positive philosophy, the philosophy of mythology, and especially the 
philosophy of revelation must have been known to Kierkegaard. (Tonny Aagaard Olesen, 
“Kierkegaard und Schelling. Eine historische Einführung“ J. Hennigfeld and J. Stewart, 
Kierkegaard und Schelling, Berlin: W. de Gruyter 2003, 1-103.) 
In the context of what I have suggested above, Kierkegaard’s importance in the history 
of religion and revelation during the early 19th century can be delineated as follows. The 
notion of historicity, a central thought of the second and later Schelling, makes itself visible in 
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 “Having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed 
in himself.”—See also my paper on the relationship between a human person and revelation: Balázs Mezei, 
“Divine Revelation and Human Person”, Philosophy and Theology, vol. 18, number 2, 337-354, 2008. 
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his analysis of freedom, the history of mythology, and especially the historical-theistic 
process of revelation. For Schelling, positive philosophy goes beyond the synthesis of Hegel, 
for the latter was not able to grasp—according to Schelling—the really concrete, the 
genuinely existing, that is God’s being.21 Kierkegaard’s general position against Hegel 
implies a number of aspects, which can be seen as closely related to the latter Schelling’s 
thought. First, Kierkegaard emphasizes the genuinely existing subject, the concrete human 
person in his and her life and death. Second, Kierkegaard refuses the possibility of a monistic 
(as he often calls, “naturalistic”) synthesis of reality in which God and humans, the 
transcendent and the worldly could be impeccably integrated. Third, Kierkegaard emphasizes 
God’s unlimited power above and beyond the world and especially human beings, a power 
impossible to contradict or even to rationally conceive. Fourthly and consequently, a human 
person’s position vis-à-vis God is by definition paradoxical. Finally, the only way to know 
about God’s being and orders is to take cognizance of His unconditionally sovereign 
revelation.  
As Johannes Hirschberger writes, 
Marx meant the socialist subversion of the tranquil and authoritative civil world 
of Hegel. Kierkegaard meant the Christian subversion. We have to see this 
parallelism. (Johannes Hirschberger, Geschichte der Philosophie, Freiburg i. B.: 
Herder 2008, 492)  
 
Kierkegaard’s “subversion” sought to acknowledge the genuine existence of a 
concrete human being, who has grown out not only of the hierarchical world of Catholicism 
but also of the customary pietism of standard Protestantism. Kierkegaard’s importance in 
opening up an entirely new vista in the history of philosophy, a view focusing on a concrete 
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 Feuerbach and the Left Hegelians followed a similar kind of criticism, though not with respect to God, but 
with respect to being, and especially human being.  
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human being, cannot be overestimated. By depicting a human being at the crossroad of 
“either-or”, Kierkegaard highlighted human freedom in its extreme and paradoxical 
inappropriateness. For his understanding of human freedom is at the same time central and 
peripheral. It is central in his urging a human being to choose between God and the world, and 
it is peripheral in emphasizing God’s unconceivable omnipotence over human freedom.  
Thus a new understanding of divine revelation is delineated in Kierkegaard’s works. It 
seems indeed that what Kierkegaard suggests is just a version of fundamentalist Biblical 
theology, a traditional emphasis on God’s absolute sovereignty, a piece of Kierkegaard’s anti-
Hegelian rhetoric. In fact, however, the context of Kierkegaard’s other ideas, especially his 
point on God’s power over a fragile human being, changes the apparently traditional view of 
revelation. Most importantly, the emphasis on the paradoxical nature of God’s revealing 
himself challenges the traditional view of revelation as something accessible to the rational 
possibilities of a human being. As Kierkegaard writes: 
Merely to obtain the knowledge that God is unlike him, man needs the help of 
God; and now he learns that God is absolutely different from himself. But if God 
and man are absolutely different, this cannot be accounted for on the basis of 
what man derives from God, for in so far they are akin. Their unlikeness must 
therefore be explained by what man derives from himself, or by what he has 
brought upon his own head. But what can this unlikeness be? Aye, what can it be 
but sin; since the unlikeness, the absolute unlikeness, is something that man has 
brought upon himself… The consciousness of sin, which he indeed could no more 
teach to another than another could teach it to him, but only God—if God 
consents to become a Teacher. But this was his purpose, as we have imagined it. 
In order to be man’s Teacher, God proposed to make himself like the individual 
man, so that he might understand him fully. Thus our paradox is rendered still 
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more appalling, or the same paradox has the double aspect which proclaims it as 
the Absolute Paradox; negatively by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin, 
positively by proposing to do away with the absolute unlikeness in absolute 
likeness. (SKS, PS, Ch. 3) 
 
Kierkegaard thus proposes revelation as an absolute paradox. He attained this view by 
simultaneously emphasizing human and divine concreteness; and by focusing on a human 
person in his and her most concrete life and death. No other author before him was able to 
zoom into this double ultimacy in such a fashion. Kant maintained a balance between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal, and positioned God into the integral moral perspective of a 
human agent. Fichte tried to dissolve the tension between God and human beings by focusing 
on the focal point of the I. Hegel offered his rational yet mystical synthesis of the universal 
process, which is at the same time God’s absolute self-realization; thus a human being is a 
decisive moment in God’s reality. Schelling on the other hand offered, in his positive 
philosophy, a historical view of the universe, which is the history of God too, where a human 
being takes place as a personal moment of this history. Yet Schelling emphasized the 
existential aspect of divine reality by maintaining negativity in the historical reality of God. 
Kierkegaard, however, never aspired to such high knowledge of God and history; his 
insistence to the core Christian views, the Bible, and traditional piety led him to realize what 
Schelling wanted to see in God, that is the paradoxical nature of God and humans.  
That is Kierkegaard’s last word on this central problem of Classical German Thought. 
The history of reflection, however, did not end with Kierkegaard. Nietzsche, Scheler, 
Heidegger and his followers continued this work and opened new possibilities in the 
understanding of revelation (Koslowski, Philosophien der Offenbarung, 833 sq; Mezei “Two 
Models of Revelation: Propositional vs. Radical”).  
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6. Some consequences 
 
What is the importance of the notion of revelation as reshaped in Classical German 
Philosophy? Protestant theology offered a vivid rebuttal to these philosophical developments, 
a reaction reaching even the second half of the 20th century in the—quite different—works of 
Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Tillich, or Pannenberg. Catholic theology was more cautions 
during the 19th century: instead of a dialogue with contemporary philosophers, Rome chose 
first Neo-Aristotelism and later Neo-Thomism, thereby silencing such important initiatives as 
the Catholic Tübingen Circle or Anton Günter of Vienna. Only during the 1930s there opened 
the way to an understanding of revelation in Catholic thought, which considered important a 
number of different models of revelation. We may say that the work of K. Rahner or H. U. 
von Balthasar aimed at a renewed understanding of divine revelation. Avery Dulles, the late 
New York cardinal was too among the important authors of Catholic provenience who have 
been able to influence the discussions on the possibilities of rethinking the traditional models 
of divine revelation. The most promising direction of this work, which continues not only the 
legacy of 19th century German thought but rather the entire history of the notion of revelation, 
can be summarized with the words of Keith Ward:  
 
Divine Revelation cannot be separated out and contrasted with human reflection 
and experience. (Ward, Religion and Revelation, 231) 
 
Can we say that Keith Ward’s point is a return to a pre-Kierkegaardian position by 
excluding the absolute paradox in the notion of revelation? My answer is negative. For even 
the absolute paradox of human-divine relationship in Kierkegaard’s thought belongs to this 
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relationship, to this tension, which has kept and will keep busy philosophers and theologians 
throughout the centuries. As again Kierkegaard writes: 
The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that 
thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in all thinking, even in 
the thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in something 
transcending himself. (SKS, PS, Ch. 3) 
  
Yet, as we could promptly say, what one cannot think one in fact thinks. Otherwise it 
would be impossible to think anything about what one cannot think. By reaching this 
paradoxical point, contemporary philosophy of religion may become able to completely close 
the history of a cosmo-theological understanding of revelation and open a new chapter in 
which revelation appears as attentive openness to not yet seen possibilities of human 
existence. (Cf.  Balázs Mezei, “Religion after Auschwitz: Jonas, Metz and the Place of 
Religion in our World Today”) 
 
 
